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.. 
May 7, 2002 
For a voter in most any precinct in Knoxville, TN, 
casting a vote for President on November 7, 2000 was quite 
simple. A voter would enter the polling place, show her 
identification, sign her name, and then step into a voting 
booth. Inside the booth, she would press a few buttons, 
look over her choices, just to make sure, and then press 
the all-important "VOTE" button. A very simple process, 
the largest inconvenience might have been waiting a few 
minutes in line. Little did that Knoxville voter know 
about the discord that would begin that night and continue 
for more than a year. 
For the next two months the media in America (and many 
places around the world) was consumed by the developing 
story of the 2000 election. Every newscast, every radio 
talk show, and every newspaper had an update or a comment 
on the election controversy, and the American public was 
transfixed. Until December 12 th , when the US Supreme Court 
decision was handed down, no one really knew who would be 
the forty-third President of the United States. 
As America looks back at the lengthy progression 
toward finally naming our forty-third President, it is 
clear that something needed to be fixed. Many have blamed 
election officials, especially in the state of Florida. 
Others have criticized the media for premature 
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announcements. Still others have blamed the candidates 
themselves for making the process last so long. No matter 
who is to blame, all agree that the system needs to be 
fixed so that this problem will not reoccur. 
America has looked to the government to fix our 
election system, and there has been no lack of effort in 
attempting to resolve the situation by any branch. It does 
not happen often, but our entire government, and the 
American public, seems to agree on this: our country is 
greatly in need of election reform. 
ELECTION 2000 
Progression and OUtcome 
The 2000 Presidential election began as any other. 
Campaigns ran for over a year between the primaries and the 
general election. Election polls prior to election day 
were almost even, there was no easy prediction to be made, 
but no one would have guessed how close it would be. 
The polls closed on the evening of November 7th. News 
organizations were covering the election results very 
closely as they began to come in. Shortly after 7 p.m. 
several news organizations predicted that Al Gore would win 
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the state of Florida and its twenty-five electoral votes. 
This prediction was based on voter exit polls, turnout of 
voters at certain election precincts, and historical voting 
patterns (Bickerstaff 434). As the evening went on, 
however, George W. Bush commanded a substantial lead in the 
actual vote tally. News organizations began to reverse 
their call and predict Bush as the winner in Florida. By 
about 2 a.m., it appeared that Bush had indeed won Florida 
and the Presidency with a lead of around 50,000 votes. At 
about 2:30 a.m. Gore called Bush to communicate his 
intention to concede the race (435). 
Then, as members of both parties and the public 
watched in amazement, Bush's lead in Florida shrank to 
fewer than 6,000 votes. Gore called Bush again to say that 
things had changed and he was no longer planning on 
conceding. By the next morning, Bush's lead in Florida had 
shrunk to 1,784, and it was now clear to all that winning 
the state of Florida was essential to winning the election 
for both candidates. Both parties sent hordes of lawyers 
to Florida to prepare for what became a massive legal and 
political battle over the certification of the winner of 
Florida's electoral votes (Bickerstaff 435). 
With 6 million votes cast, and a margin of less than 2 
thousand, a statewide recount was automatically triggered. 
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This recount was conducted by election officials using 
mostly the same counting equipment and procedures as they 
had on election night. When the recounts from Florida's 
sixty-seven counties came in, by one unofficial count, 
Bush's lead had dropped to 327 votes (Bickerstaff 435). 
Over the next several weeks, different types of 
disputed ballots would be identified (which will be 
discussed later), but most of the controversy centered 
around ballots that the counting equipment recorded as 
having no vote for any Presidential candidate (undervote), 
or more than one vote for a Presidential candidate 
(overvote) (Bickerstaff 436). 
Gore attorneys properly petitioned for manual recounts 
of undervotes in four Florida counties: Miami-Dade, 
Broward, Palm Beach, and Volus It soon became clear 
that it would not be possible to complete manual recounts 
by the statutory deadline of November 14th. At that time 
the Florida Secretary of State was to certify a winner of 
the election (Bickerstaff 437). The counties sought to 
file returns that would include the manual recounts after 
the deadline, but Secretary of State Katherine Harris 
rejected the appeal. She announced that she would certify 
the outcome of the election based on those returns she 
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received on or before November 14th and the returns of 
overseas absentee ballots (438). 
The Florida Democratic Party and Al Gore filed actions 
seeking to compel the Secretary of State to accept the 
amended returns. The cases were certified by the Dist ct 
Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. On November 
17 th , the Florida Supreme Court enjoined the Secretary 
State from certifying the election results until further 
order of the court. On November 21st , the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled that there should not be any "hyper-techni 
reI upon statutory provisions" and ordered the 
of State to accept the amended returns received 
by 5 p.m. that Sunday the 26th • Bush appealed this 
decision, and by a unanimous vote, the United States 
Supreme Court vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision 
and remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court to 
fy details that would determine if the case presented 
a federal question within the jurisdiction of the US 
Supreme Court (Bickerstaff 438). 
During all this, Bush's lead had increased to 930 
counted votes once the absentee overseas ballots were 
included. On November 26th , only Broward and Volusia 
counties had finished manual recounts, and that evening 
George W. Bush was certified the winner of the Florida 
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election by 537 out of approximately 6 million votes. Now, 
Gore was only left with the option of contesting the 
election itself to challenge the certified result. He 
led an election contest in Leon County Circuit Court and 
after trial on December 3rd and 4th, his claims were denied 
by Circuit Judge Sauls (Bickerstaff 438 439). 
Gore's attorneys quickly appealed Judge Sauls' ruling, 
and on December 8th , the Florida Supreme Court reversed 
Sauls' decision. The court ordered that the recounted 
return from Palm Beach County and the partially recounted 
return form Miami-Dade County be included in the totals. 
This reduced Bush's lead to 193 votes. The court also 
ordered that the 9,000 Miami-Dade undervote ballots (which 
had not yet been reviewed) be recounted by hand and any 
legal votes be added to the total statewide certifications 
{Bickerstaff 439}. 
Soon thereafter the United States Supreme Court stayed 
the order of the Florida Supreme Court. On December 12th, 
in a 7-2 decision, the US Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Florida Supreme Court. However, the court 
was much more divided than the 7-2 ruling suggests. Seven 
members of the court agreed that there was a violation of 
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Yet, only five justices agreed that the correct remedy was 
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to stop the process and hand the election to Bush. The 
other four justices believed a recount should have been 
finished, either the one ordered by the Florida Supreme 
Court, or one more Constitutionally crafted. Nonetheless, 
the decision effectively brought an end to the legal 
battle. With this ruling, George W. Bush received the 
twenty-five electoral votes from Florida, and thus became 
the winner of the 2000 Presidential election (Bickerstaff 
439) • 
Prab~ems with the E~ection 
No election is perfect. In almost every election in 
the United States, there is some flaw in the voting system. 
However, very rarely are these flaws as exaggerated or as 
widely publicized as those in Florida during the 2000 
election. 
Looking back, there were eight types of problematic 
votes, or potential votes, that existed on November 8th • 
Numerous state or federal lawsuits were filed challenging 
these different categories of potential votes or alleged 
voting irregularities, but few were ever addressed, and 
even fewer had any impact on the outcome of the election. 
The eight types of problematic votes are as follows: 
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1. An estimated 110,000 ballots on which no vote was 
counted because the electronic counting equipment 
recorded votes on the ballot for more than one 
presidential candidate (overvotes); 
2. An estimated 43,000 to 70,000 ballots on which no 
vote for any presidential candidate was counted 
because the electronic counting equipment recorded 
no vote (undervotes); 
3. Absentee votes in at least two counties (Seminole 
and Martin) where local election officials allowed 
Republican Party officials to correct absentee 
ballot applications after the applications had been 
received in the election official's office; 
4. Differences between the initial count and a second 
tabulation in Nassau County that produced 218 fewer 
votes, with a net gain of 51 votes for Bush; 
5. Overseas absentee ballots that were counted even 
though the envelopes containing the ballots failed 
to have the date postmarked as required by state 
law; 
6. Differences in the condition and type of voting 
equipment used by Florida counties that are alleged 
to have caused significant disparities in the 
percentage of overvotes and undervotes among 
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counties, with the highest percentage of uncounted 
ballots (primarily overvotes) occurring in areas of 
the state with large African-American or Caribbean-
American neighborhoods; 
7. Ballots uncast because of the alleged intimidation 
of voters, primarily in African-American or 
Caribbean-American neighborhoods; 
8. Registered voters who remained ineligible on 
election day because they had not corrected an 
erroneous finding by state election officials that 
they had out-of-state felony convictions. 
(Bickerstaff 436-437) 
To give a more concrete example to some of the types 
above, let us look at the 10,644 Miami-Dade County ballots 
that election officials excluded from the count because 
they were not readable by the counting machines. An 
unofficial recount found that 3,061 ballots bore some kind 
of marking that could be interpreted as a vote for either 
Bush or Gore (netting Gore a total of 49 votes) [type 2 
above]; 4,892 ballots bore no markings for President [also 
type 2]; 527 ballots bore markings for more than one 
presidential candidate [type 1]; and 1,912 ballots bore 
clean punches in vacant ballot positions [also included in 
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type 2], with 1,667 of these just below the numbers 
corresponding to one of the two major candidates (Coenen 
873) _ 
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Another major concern with the election in Florida was 
due to the layout of the ballot in Palm Beach County_ The 
ballot used in Palm Beach County was a "butterfly ballot." 
This type of ballot had candidate names on both pages and 
punch-holes down the center. The layout of names on the 
ballot made it easy to correctly mark a vote for Bush; to 
do this, voters only had to match the first name with the 
first punch-hole. However, to mark a vote for Gore, one 
would have to match the second name on the left-hand side 
of the ballot with the third punch hole in the center of 
the ballot. If a voter mistakenly punched the second hole 
on the ballot, they cast a vote for Pat Buchanan whose name 
was listed on the right-hand side of the ballot, slightly 
higher than Al Gore's name and slightly lower than George 
Bush's name (Brady 59-60). 
Also, the Palm Beach County ballots instructed voters 
to "vote for group". According to some Gore voters, this 
led them to punch two names for president (making their 
ballot an overvote) since there were holes next to both 
Gore and Leiberman's names (Brady 60). 
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Palm Beach County's election results suggested that a 
large number of people may have made these mistakes. Pat 
Buchanan received almost 20% of his total statewide support 
in Palm Beach County, which only contains 7% of the voters 
in Florida. Using these numbers, it can be determined that 
over 2,000 Gore supporters may have mistakenly voted for 
Buchanan. FUrthermore, the number of overvotes was over 
19,000. This number is very high compared to those of 
other counties. These two facts lead to a great 
probability that numerous Gore votes were lost due to the 
ballot form. With the election result in Florida ending in 
a difference of less than 1,000 votes, the butterfly ballot 
might have proved to be the difference in the outcome of 
the Florida election (Brady 60). 
Reactions to the 2000 Eleotion 
There have been many responses to the 2000 election 
and all its problems. Some responses do not directly 
address problems specific to this election. For instance, 
reformers have debated the merits of electing the President 
by popular vote since the beginnings of our country. The 
occasional occurrence of a candidate winning the presidency 
without a plurality of the popular vote inescapably 
resurrects this issue. The 2000 election proved to be no 
exception, but it is unlikely to produce any such reform 
(Coenen 872). 
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Less radical proposals for altering the electoral 
college system have also come up. One example is replacing 
the winner-take-all system currently employed by forty-
eight states with a proportional system tied to either the 
statewide popular vote or the popular vote of individual 
electoral districts (Coenen 872). Other, more germane 
reactions have come up on both the state and federal level. 
Some of these will now be discussed. 
Reaction in F~orida 
Florida's Governor, Jeb Bush, recently signed a state 
election reform law that makes many improvements to the 
Florida election system. The first and most exciting 
change is the total elimination of punch-card voting. 
Instead, most Florida voters will now use optical-scanning 
technology to vote. This technology is similar to what is 
used on the SAT and other standardized tests. This system 
requires voters to fill in a bubble or an arrow on a sheet 
of paper to indicate their vote. In the 2000 election, 
this type of optical scanning technology outpaced all other 
systems by leaving the fewest invalid and uncounted 
ballots. An additional benefit to the optical scanning 
technology is that voters can test the validity of their 
ballot before they turn it in. To do this, the voter 
simply runs his or her ballot through a scanner, and the 
machine will tell the voter if a counting machine will be 
able to read the ballot or not (Schwartz). 
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Another provision in the Florida election reform law 
deals with provisional ballots. Provisional ballots are 
given to people who arrive at a polling place and discover 
that they do not appear on the voter registry. With 
provisional voting, these people are allowed to vote, while 
election officials will later verify the validity of the 
vote. Without provisional ballots, many eligible voters 
are turned away because of a mistake in the voter registry 
(Schwart z) . 
A third change included in the reform law an 
allotment of $5.9 million to both voter education and 
training of poll workers. Before this law, there were very 
low expenditures in both these areas (Schwartz). 
Also, this law extended the period for certification 
of election results. It has been changed from seven to 
eleven days. This would allow more time to conduct 
recounts if necessary. Furthermore, the new law requires 
hand recounts in all close elections. On the other hand, 
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state officials can still delay recounts as they did in the 
2000 election to attempt to prevent recounts from being 
completed (Schwartz). 
FEe Reaction 
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is charged, by 
Congress, with administering and enforcing the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA). The FEC is an independent 
regulatory agency whose main duties deal with the 
disclosure and regulation of campaign finances, but they 
also deal with some election administration (FEC Homepage) . 
In response 'to the 2000 election, the FEC is in the 
process of revising its "Voluntary Standards for 
Computerized Voting Systems" (the Standards). This set of 
documents, designed to guide the development of 
computerized voting systems, provides functional and 
technical requirements for a number of different voting 
systems. It also provides testing specifications and 
processes for these requirements. The Standards, which 
revise those published in 1990, are voluntary_ However, 
thirty-eight states have chosen to adopt them either in 
whole or in part, and currently use them to design systems 
and obtain equipment. The Standards also address the 
following: ways to meet the needs of disabled voters; 
specific software standards for ballot counting, vote 
processing, etc.; performance requirements to provide 
direct feedback to the voter indicating an invalid vote 
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(this is part of the new Florida law discussed earlier); 
and performance requirements for the content and labeling 
of data provided to the media and other organizations prior 
to certification (FEC Record 1-2) . 
The Commission released this draft of the Standards 
for public comment on December 13, 2001. An earlier draft 
had been released in July of 2001, and the FEC has since 
made substantive revisions (FEC Record 1-2). 
Legis~ative Reaction 
In the wake of the 2000 election, many Americans have 
turned to Congress to fix the problems that became apparent 
in Florida and that undoubtedly exist in other parts of the 
country. True to form, Congress has given an extensive 
response to this outcry. 
In the first forty-five days of the 107 th Congress, six 
bills were introduced in the Senate or House of 
Representatives dealing with standardizing voting 
procedures across the country. These proposals have 
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centered on two key procedural reforms: 1) Minimum national 
standards for voting devices or machines, and 2} A uniform 
national ballot (Coenen 874). 
One bill, introduced by Senator Reid of Nevada, and 
entitled the National Election Standards Act of 2001, would 
instruct the FEC to establish uniform national standards 
for federal election procedures, including the type of 
ballots used and the use of counting machines. Other 
bills, introduced into both houses of Congress by members 
of both major parties, would form a new national commission 
to study these issues. Each bill takes a slightly 
different approach, but most focus on having the commission 
investigate and recommend changes to voting procedures and 
technology. All of these bills raise the implication of 
Congress imposing national election-technology standards 
and uniform ballots for federal elections (Coenen 874-5) . 
This in turn raises the question of Congress's 
constitutional power to do so, which will be addressed in 
the next few paragraphs. 
This is not the first time in history that there has 
been uproar about the federal election system. In the 1876 
election between Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel J. Tilden, 
there were four states that sent more than one slate of 
electors to Congress, one slate for Hayes and one slate for 
Tilden. The reform legislation that followed focused on 
intracongressional counting of electoral votes and 
encouraged timely electoral vote reporting by the states. 
It did not, like the proposed reforms of today, place any 
concrete duties on states or alter any "on-the-ground" 
election processes (Coenen 876). The proposed reforms of 
today however, are more far-reaching and thus require more 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Constitutional authority for these proposed reforms 
could come from many dif sources; some possible 
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sources are better than others. Some years ago, one might 
have seriously considered the Commerce Clause of Article 1, 
Section 8 to justify national election reform. It is 
possible to argue that these ballots, and other pieces of 
election equipment in question, help determine who is 
President, and the President plays a key role in shaping 
national economic policy, which greatly affects interstate 
commerce. However, modern Supreme Court decisions lead us 
away from this line of j fication. For instance, in 
Printz v. United States, the Court held that Congress may 
not, under the commerce power, force state officials to 
administer federal programs. To require state officials to 
use federally mandated ballots would violate this decision. 
Therefore we must turn elsewhere for legal authority 
(Coenen 879-80). 
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Another possible source of authority could be the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its Section 5 enforcement clause. 
Through Bush v. Gore, the US Supreme Court has already 
established that the lack of consistency in Florida's hand-
recount standards was a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause. Thus, according to 
Section 5, Congress may "enforce, by appropriate 
legislation," the provisions of the Amendment. However, 
due to the proportionality limitation established in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, Congress could not require sweeping 
changes. For instance, Congress most likely could not 
require that every voting precinct in the country use 
optical scanners or the exact same ballot (Coenen 881-6). 
There also exists an implied congressional power to 
regulate federal elections. This power is founded in court 
cases starting with Ex parte Yarbrough. In Yarbrough, the 
Court spoke broadly of the federal government's "power to 
protect the elections on which its existence depends from 
violence and corruption," as well as its duty to ensure 
that federal office holders are in fact "the free and 
uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take part 
in that choice." (Yarbrough) Drawing on Yarbrough, the 
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Court, in Burroughs v. United States, invoked the federal 
government's inherent "power of self protection" in passing 
legislation to protect its own elections (Burroughs). It 
went on to say that since Congress has the power to protect 
the election of the President, it could develop means to 
attain that end as long as those means are really 
calculated to that end. Drawing from these cases, we can 
see where the Court may uphold legislation to further 
regulate federal elections (Coenen 887-9). 
Successful Legislation 
With so many pieces of legislation introduced into 
both the House and Senate, it was evident that few of the 
bills would make it very far in the legislative process. 
With all of the bills being similar in nature, obviously, 
only one bill will make it to the desk of the President. 
Two pieces of legislation have survived from the many that 
were introduced. One originated in the House and the other 
in the Senate. The substance of these bills and the 
reactions to them will now be addressed. 
House of Representatives Bi~~ 3295 
On December 12, 2001, exactly one year after a 
controversial Supreme Court ruling decided the 2000 
presidential election; the House easily passed a bill to 
reform the nation's election system. The bill was titled 
the "Help America Vote Act of 2001", and would affect all 
federal elections including presidential and congressional 
elections. The 363 to 63 passage vote showed strong 
bipartisan support for this piece of legislation. 
Representative Robert Ney, a Republican from Ohio, and 
Representative Steny Hoyer, a Democrat from Maryland, 
primarily sponsored the bill. These two men are the chair 
and ranking Democrat, respectively, on the House 
Administration Commi ttee (Walsh, House Approves ... ) . 
H.R. 3295 would provide a total of $2.65 billion over 
three years to upgrade voting equipment, improve the 
accuracy of voter registration lists, recruit and train 
poll workers, and enhance accessibility to polling places 
for people with disabilities. The funding would include a 
one-time payment of $400 million to states and counties to 
replace punch-card voting systems, which were used by more 
than one-third of U.S. voters in the 2000 election (Walsh, 
House Approves ... ) . 
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The bill would also require states to adopt "minimum 
standards" for voting, but would allow the states and 
localities considerable leeway in deciding how to meet the 
standards (Walsh, Election Officials~). The bill would 
also require the creation of statewide voter registration 
lists linked to local precincts, a uniform definition of 
what constitutes a vote, and a system for provisional 
voting. States would be required to meet the minimum 
standards even if they did not accept federal funds to 
upgrade their voting systems (Walsh, House Approves ... ) . 
Senate Bi~~ 565 
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Hours after the passage of H.R. 3295, Senators 
announced details for a similar bill to corne before the 
Senate. This bill, entitled the "Equal Protection of 
Voting Rights Act of 2001", passed the Senate on April 11, 
2002 by a vote of 99 to 1. Senator Christopher Dodd, a 
Democrat from Connecticut, and Senator Mitch McConnell of 
Kentucky, were the primary sponsors of the bill. Senator 
Dodd is the Chairman of the Senate Rules and Administration 
Committee, and Senator McConnell its ranking Republican. 
Also making major contributions to the bill were Senators 
Christopher Bond, a Republican from Missouri, and Charles 
Schumer, a Democrat from New York (Walsh, Election 
Reform ... ) . 
The Senate bill establishes three basic minimum 
requirements that would need to be met by the 2004 
election. Those requirements are as follows, in the words 
of Senator Dodd: 
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"First, it requires that voting systems meet minimum 
standards on error rates, provide access for the disabled 
and language minorities, provide notification to voters of 
overvotes, and provide voters an opportunity to correct the 
ballot before it is tabulated." Second is a requirement of 
provisional voting. And finally, "to address fraud 
concerns, states must establish statewide, computerized 
voter registration lists and require verification of 
identity for first-time voters who register by mail. The 
[bill] also creates a new Election Administration 
Commission to ensure ongoing federal support for the 
administration of federal elections." (Dodd) 
The Senate bill would provide up to $3.8 billion in 
federal funds, over five years, for meeting the new 
requirements, upgrading voting equipment and procedures, 
educating voters, and training poll workers (Dodd). 
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Differences in the Bi~~s 
These two bills have the same goals for election 
reform, but each takes a somewhat different approach toward 
those ends. The Senate bill sets minimum standards for the 
states to meet in certain aspects of election 
administration, whereas the House bill gives more leeway to 
the states by requiring the states to set their own minimum 
standards. The House bill includes a one-time payment of 
$400 million for replacing punch-card voting systems; the 
Senate bill has no such provision. However, the Senate 
bill provides $1.15 billion more in total funding. Another 
difference is that the voter identification requirement of 
the Senate bill is not echoed in the House bill (Walsh, 
Election Reform ... ) . 
Reactions to the Bi~~s 
Many political actors have expressed their praise or 
criticism for these bills. Some favor one over another, 
others oppose both, still others do not care which one is 
enacted, as long as something is done. 
Certain interest groups have expressed their feelings 
on these bills. H.R. 3295 was opposed by several civil 
rights and disability rights organizations as well as the 
League of Women Voters, which described it as a 
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"significantly flawed bill" (Walsh, House Approves ... ). When 
ask about S. 565, the League stated that the Senate bill 
"can be the antidote to the flawed election reform bill 
recently passed by the House." Also, the American 
Association of People with Disabilities described the 
Senate bill as "a huge victory for the disability 
community." (Dodd) On the other hand, Civil Rights groups 
are skeptical of the identification requirement of the 
Senate bill; they fear that it could be used to deny 
minori ties the right to vote (Walsh, Election Reform ... ) . 
States have also voiced opinions on the matter. A 
survey of election officials in 36 states and 208 local 
jurisdictions found that a strong majority would welcome 
federal grants to help pay for improvements in voting 
procedures and equipment. However, those same officials 
oppose the federal government setting standards for 
elections as a condition of providing more funding, with 
the opposition stronger among state elections officials 
than among their local counterparts {Walsh, Election 
Officials ... } . 
President Bush has also voiced his opinion on each 
bill. Following the passage of H.R. 3295, he issued a 
statement saying the bill "goes a long way" toward the 
changes he advocates (Walsh, House Approves ... ). After the 
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Senate passed its bill, Bush praised the Senate action but 
indicated his support for the House approach to the issue. 
He said he hopes for the enactment of legislation that 
would "respect the primacy of state and local governments, 
and envision a limited but responsible role for the federal 
government." (Walsh, Election Reform. .. ) 
T.he FUture of the Legis~ation 
So, what happens now? There are two different 
proposals for election reform, and both houses of Congress 
must pass the exact same piece of legislation before it can 
go before the President. On May 1st, both Houses appointed 
members to the conference committee charged with working 
out the differences in the two bills. This committee will 
hopefully produce one bill that will go back to both houses 
of Congress for passage. Assuming both houses adopt the 
bill, it will then go to the President for his signature or 
veto. From there, depending on the final wording of the 
bill, a commission will be established and they will begin 
working toward the 2004 election. 
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Conclusion 
No matter what form is taken, and what words are used, 
America will soon have an answer to its need for election 
reform. Although the process of realizing problems is a 
rough one, those who learn from the problems always come 
out better than they were before. America struggled with 
the Election of 2000, but it will emerge a stronger nation 
because of the challenge. The proposed legislation should, 
in the words of Senator Dodd, "ensure that every eligible 
American has the opportunity to both cast a vote and have 
that vote counted," (Dodd). Hopefully, the larger effect 
will be even greater than that. The efforts of so many 
will eventually restore the faith of Americans in their 
election system, the supreme icon of the democracy we 
treasure above all. 
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